In mid-June 2025, the international think tank Ember released a detailed report analyzing the latest National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) submitted by EU Member States. The findings clearly point to shifting trends in the energy sector – most notably, a continued decline in natural gas demand, alongside a rapid increase in the share of renewable energy sources and the electrification of the economy.

Ember projects that by 2030, gas consumption in the EU will fall by 7%, from 326 billion m³ in 2023 to 302 billion m³. This aligns with a broader trend already visible on the market – since 2021, demand for this fuel has dropped by as much as 19%.

However, the analysis does not include the updated Polish National Energy and Climate Plan (KPEiK), as Poland failed to submit its revised plan on time – a point Ember explicitly highlights. While this might appear to be a mere formality, in practice it leaves a significant gap, particularly in the context of the largest economy in Central and Eastern Europe. The assumptions outlined in the draft KPEiK foresee a substantial increase in electricity consumption – exceeding 300 TWh by 2040, nearly double the current level of 169 TWh in 2024. As for natural gas, the plan anticipates peak domestic demand occurring between 2025 and 2030, reaching approximately 23 billion m³ – a more than 20% increase from the current level of just under 19 billion m³.

Demographics vs. energy: A disconnect that could cost billions

Amid the optimistic planning assumptions for Poland’s energy sector – especially in terms of electricity demand – a fundamental mismatch is becoming increasingly apparent: the difference between demographic projections and actual population trends. A June analysis published by WysokieNapiecie.pl reveals that the KPEiK relies exclusively on the Central Statistical Office’s (GUS) “high” population growth scenario from 2023. This scenario assumes a sharp increase in immigration, higher birth rates, and an end to net emigration.

Current GUS data, however, indicates that Poland’s actual population at the end of 2023 and into 2024 is more in line with the “medium” or even “low” scenarios – both of which were ignored in the energy plan. In fact, in 2024 the population almost exactly matched the low variant forecast, raising serious concerns about basing major energy investments on a single, highly optimistic demographic projection.

Moreover, the number of working-age people in Poland has been steadily declining – down by 3 million since 2010, with a further decrease of 5.6 million expected by 2060. These demographic shifts inevitably impact national energy demand – both in households and industry, which depends on workforce availability and consumption scale. Experience from countries like Japan illustrates that aging, shrinking societies tend to consume less energy, regardless of electrification progress. Japan, for instance, has seen electricity consumption fall by an average of 2% annually since 2010, despite growth in electric mobility and automation.

Can Poland be an exception in Europe?

Poland’s demographic trajectory does differ from many Western European countries, where aging populations are offset by rising immigration and a growing share of foreign-born residents and their descendants. In contrast, current demographic forecasts for Poland – paired with its restrictive migration policy – suggest that the population will either decline or remain stagnant at best. The only factor that could reverse this trend would be a significant increase in permanent immigration – a scenario that remains highly uncertain and politically sensitive.

In this context, while Ember rightly highlights the changing direction of EU energy policy, forecasts of future energy demand at the national level must be treated with caution. Ember does not delve deeply into demographic impacts – understandably, given the EU-wide scope of its analysis – but this makes it all the more essential for countries to rigorously model such variables themselves. Ignoring demographic trends could lead to costly overestimations of demand and, consequently, overinvestment in energy infrastructure – both in generation capacity and grid systems.

Consequences: Investments and the risk of stranded assets

Both the conclusions of Ember’s report and the assumptions in Poland’s KPEiK underscore the growing risk of so-called "stranded assets" – energy infrastructure that, due to changing demand realities, may never deliver a return on investment. Across the EU, this risk is particularly acute in the case of LNG terminals, whose capacity is set to increase by over 50% by 2030 – despite projections of continued gas demand decline.

In Poland, similar risks could emerge in relation to planned nuclear and gas-fired power plants if actual energy consumption – shaped by population size, age structure, and economic activity – turns out to be significantly lower than projected.

It’s worth recalling that GUS’s 2011 demographic forecasts accurately predicted Poland’s population in 2025. Yet, in the current planning cycle, the potential variability of future population scenarios has been largely ignored – a shortcoming that could lead to planning errors on a far greater scale than previous instances of over- or underestimating demand.

As Kuba Gogolewski, expert and project coordinator at the RT-ON Foundation, emphasizes:

“Ember’s report is a vital contribution to the debate on the future of European energy. However, it’s important to note that its authors do not analyze the impact of demographics on demand. EU Member States differ significantly in current and projected population levels, the pace of societal aging, and immigration rates. In Poland’s case – where the current population already diverges from official planning assumptions – overlooking these factors could lead to serious strategic errors. Especially since Poland is projected to experience one of the fastest population declines and rates of population aging in Europe.”

The need for flexible and realistic scenarios

The takeaways from both Ember’s findings and domestic energy-demographic analyses are clear: the future of energy systems must be planned with a multi-variable approach – and demographics are a key part of that equation. Without this, countries like Poland risk not only inefficient investment but also locking resources into projects that may fail to meet the needs of a smaller, older, and less energy-intensive society.